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The mind wanders, even when people are attempting to make complex decisions. We
suggest that mind wandering—allowing one’s thoughts to wander until the “correct”
choice comes to mind—can positively impact people’s feelings about their decisions. We
compare post-choice satisfaction from choices made by mind wandering to reason-based
choices and randomly assigned outcomes. Participants chose a poster by mind wandering
or deliberating, or were randomly assigned a poster. Whereas forecasters predicted that
participants who chose by mind wandering would evaluate their outcome as inferior to
participants who deliberated (Experiment 1), participants who used mind wandering as
a decision strategy evaluated their choice just as positively as did participants who used
deliberation (Experiment 2). In some cases, it appears that people can spare themselves
the effort of deliberation and instead “decide by wind wandering,” yet experience no
decrease in satisfaction.
Keywords: decision strategies, post-choice satisfaction, mind wandering, spontaneous thought, deliberation
The mind regularly wanders while people perform tasks that,
at face value, would seem to demand their full attention. Most
drivers have had the experience of realizing that they have just
been driving on autopilot—that there is a substantial gap in
their memory of the drive itself. Mind wandering is not unique
to driving (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Mason et al., 2007;
Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). Consider a routine trip to the
grocery store. While navigating store aisles, people may occasion-
ally find that products have appeared in their cart while their
mind was focused on something else. The mind can be on a simi-
lar sort of autopilot while engaging in other spontaneous decision
processes. Rather than considering their options carefully, for
example, people may choose to eat at the first restaurant that pops
into their mind. We propose that people may underestimate sat-
isfaction with decisions made by mind wandering. We show that
people anticipate the results of such decision processes to be less
satisfying than the results of more deliberate decision processes,
but post-choice satisfaction is often as high whether deciding by
mind wandering or deliberating.
Most theories of legal and economic decision making suggest
that controlled thought processes such as logic, deliberation, and
planning are likely to best reflect the intentions, desires, and pref-
erences of the person who is the decision maker (for a review, see
Morewedge et al., 2010). Having consciously deliberated choice
alternatives and their consequences before making a decision
(premeditation) is considered the best indicator of rational action
by the legal system and society at large (Denno, 2003). Formal
economic theories of decision making such as the rational agent
model posit that choosing the best outcome requires that one
consider the utility of each alternative and choose the alternative
with the highest expected value (VonNeumann andMorgenstern,
1944). These theories acknowledge that in some cases people
satisfice—choose an option that meets their threshold of an
acceptable outcome. Satisficing is an inferior strategy imple-
mented when one does not have the time or resources to engage a
utility maximization strategy: unless by chance, it does not result
in choosing the optimal outcome (Simon, 1957; Schwartz et al.,
2002). Because decision making by deliberation is thought to best
reflect the intentions and maximize the utility of the decision
maker, legal and economic theories suggest that people should
believe they will be most satisfied with the outcomes of decisions
made with deliberate or controlled thinking (Morewedge et al.,
2010).
Decisions made by mind wandering do not fall into the cate-
gory of decisions made through deliberate or controlled thinking.
Mind wandering entails, “the conscious processing of informa-
tion that is unrelated to immediate sensory input and to the task
currently being performed” (Smallwood et al., 2011). By defini-
tion, decisionsmade bymind wandering entail a process that does
not involve deliberation or controlled thinking about choice alter-
natives. Instead, decisions made by mind wandering belong to the
category of decisionsmade by spontaneous thought. Spontaneous
thought is stimulus independent thought, “streams of thoughts
and images unrelated to immediate sensory input” (Teasdale
et al., 1995). Other members of this category include random
thoughts, dreams, intuition, intrusive thoughts, and Freudian
slips (Morewedge et al., in preparation). As mind wandering and
most forms of spontaneous thoughts do not typically adhere to
the kind of controlled stimulus-dependent thinking that charac-
terizes rational deliberation, we suggest that people will anticipate
the outcome of decisions made by mind wandering to be less
satisfactory than the outcomes of decisions made by deliberation.
There is reason, however, to suggest that in some cases sponta-
neous thought processes such as mind wandering might result in
outcomes that provide equal or greater satisfaction as outcomes
resulting from deliberative thought processes. Previous research
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has found that various forms of spontaneous thought are believed
to be more revealing, providing better access into the mind of the
thinker, than similar forms of deliberate thinking. Information
revealed in a dream is believed to reveal more meaningful infor-
mation about the self than the same information revealed by a
similar conscious thought, and consequently can have a greater
impact on the emotions and behavioral intentions of the dreamer
(Morewedge and Norton, 2009). The greater self-insight that peo-
ple attribute to spontaneous than deliberate thoughts can also
result in spontaneous thoughts having a greater impact on the
attitudes and perceptions of the thinker (Critcher et al., 2013;
Kupor et al., forthcoming). If people believe that spontaneous
thoughts reveal as much or more insight into their self and others
than do more deliberate and controlled forms of thinking, they
may believe that the decisions they make spontaneously reveal
their preferences even when the outcome of those decisions are
not what they would have chosen if they made that decision
deliberately.
The features of a decision may suggest that a spontaneous
or intuitive strategy is in some cases preferable to more careful
rational deliberation. Rational deliberate strategies are consid-
ered superior for choices that are seen as objectively evaluable,
sequential, complex, or precise. Sometimes, however, intuitive
strategies may be viewed as good or better for choices that are
more subjective, holistic, or simple (Inbar et al., 2010). If deliber-
ation leads decisionmakers to overanalyze a choice and introspect
about their preferences to the point of temporarily altering those
preferences, deliberation can lead people to choose less satisfying
outcomes (Wilson and Schooler, 1991). Participants who thought
about the reasons for their preferences prior to choosing one of
two posters, for example, reported lower satisfaction with their
choice of poster 3 weeks later than did participants who chose one
of the two posters without thinking about the reasons for their
preferences (Wilson et al., 1993).
In order to directly test mind wandering as a decision strat-
egy, we compared predicted and reported post-choice satisfaction
using deliberation or mind wandering as a decision strategy in
two experiments. We also compared predicted and reported sat-
isfaction with choice outcomes of both mind wandering and
deliberate strategies to predicted and reported satisfaction with
random assignment of an outcome. We expected that predicted
satisfaction with mind wandering as a choice strategy would be
lower than with optimal deliberate choice strategies (Experiment
1), whereas actual post-choice satisfaction with mind wandering
as a choice strategy would be as high as with optimal delib-
erate choice strategies, and higher than random assignment to
outcomes (Experiment 2).
EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2: DECIDING BY MINDWANDERING
We conducted two experiments comparing predicted and
reported post-choice satisfaction between mind wandering as
a choice strategy, an optimal deliberate strategy, and random
assignment. Specifically, we compared predicted and post-choice
satisfaction with a poster chosen from an array of five posters
by mind wandering, a deliberate strategy (“choose the best”),
and random assignment. We included the random assignment
condition as a baseline to allow us to discern if similar ratings
in the choice conditions were due to equal satisfaction with the
posters selected, to there being no difference in the attractiveness
of the posters in the array, or to there being no sensitivity of out-
come evaluations to the outcome selection process (i.e., condition
assignment).
Predicted and post-choice satisfaction with the chosen alter-
natives was operationalized as the extent to which participants
predicted or reported liking the poster that they received, and
the amount of money that participants predicted or reported
that they would need to be paid to sell back that poster to the
experimenter.
An array of five posters was created from pretest ratings to
serve as a consideration set. Forty-three Americans each rated
the extent to which they liked or disliked 35 posters (pre-
sented in a random order) on an 11-point scale with endpoints,
Dislike Extremely (1) and Like Extremely (11). Color images
of each poster were presented alongside the rating scale. Five
posters that were similarly attractive formed the consideration set
for subsequent studies, all within-subject ts(41) ≤ 1.22, all ps ≥
0.23 (range: Mmost liked = 6.16, SD = 1.83; Mleast liked = 5.88,
SD = 1.82).
In Experiment 1, participants made predictions for the post-
choice satisfaction of participants who received a poster as a result
of mind wandering, an optimal deliberate strategy (choose the
best), and by random assignment. We anticipated that forecast-
ers would believe that participants who made a choice by mind
wandering would be less satisfied with their poster than those
who used an optimal deliberate strategy, but no less satisfied with
their poster than participants in the random assignment condi-
tion. In contrast, in Experiment 2, we expected that participants
who made a choice by mind wandering would be as satisfied with
their poster as participants who used an optimal deliberate strat-
egy, and more satisfied with their poster than participants in the
random assignment condition.
EXPERIMENT 1: PREDICTED SATISFACTION
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
One hundred and one residents of the United States of America
(33 women;Mage = 28.98, SD = 8.88) completed a survey on the
Internet.
Procedure
Forecasters were shown the five posters in the consideration set
and predicted the extent to which each of three groups of par-
ticipants in a laboratory experiment would be satisfied with the
poster they received. Forecasters were given the exact instructions
received by people in each group, were told that the laboratory
participants received a full-size print of the poster, and then made
their ratings. The random assignment condition was labeled as
“Group 1: Now, when you click to continue to the next ques-
tion, the computer will randomly choose a poster for you from
the array of posters.” The mind wandering condition was labeled
as “Group 2: Now, please let your mind wander until the poster
you feel most drawn to randomly comes to mind. Indicate that
poster.” The deliberation condition was labeled as “Group 3:
Think carefully about the posters until you identify the poster
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you most prefer. Indicate that poster.” Choice satisfaction was
measured in two ways: Forecasters predicted the extent to which
people in each condition would like the poster that they received
on a 7-point scales with endpoints, Extremely Dislike (1) and
Extremely Like (7). Forecasters also predicted the smallest amount
of money that people in each condition would be willing to
accept (on average) to sell their poster back to the experimenter.
Predicted willingness to accept was reported on a 15-point analog
scale rising in increments of $1 with endpoints, $1 and $15.
RESULTS
Monetary valuation
Predictions for the amount of US dollars that participants were
willing to accept to relinquish their poster were submitted to a
One-Way repeated ANOVA with three levels of selection process
(deliberate choice, mind wandering, random assignment), which
revealed a significant effect of condition, F(1, 100) = 114.26, p <
0.001, η2p = 0.53. Post-hoc tests (Fisher’s LSD) confirmed that
forecasters believed that people in the deliberate choice condi-
tion would require more money to forego their poster than would
people in the mind wandering and random assignment condi-
tions, ps< 0.001. Forecasters also believed that people in themind
wandering condition would require more money to forego their
poster than would people in the random assignment condition,
p < 0.001 (see Table 1).
Liking ratings
Predictions for liking of the selected poster were submitted to
a One-Way repeated ANOVA with three levels of selection pro-
cess (deliberate choice, mind wandering, random assignment),
which revealed a significant effect of condition, F(1, 100) = 191.75,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.66. Post-hoc tests (Fisher’s LSD) confirmed
that forecasters believed that people in the deliberate choice con-
dition would like their poster more than would people in the
mind wandering and random assignment conditions, ps< 0.001.
Forecasters also believed that people in the mind wandering con-
dition would like their poster more than would people in the
random assignment condition, p < 0.001 (See Table 1).
DISCUSSION
Consistent with our predictions, forecasters expected choices
made by mind wandering to be less satisfying than choices made
by an optimal deliberate strategy. This was true for both ratings
of liking and monetary valuations. In Experiment 2, we test our
prediction that actual choices made by mind wandering will yield
as much satisfaction as optimal deliberation strategies.
Table 1 | Predicted valuation and liking for poster received by
selection process in experiment 1.
Deliberation Mind Random
wandering assignment
Monetary valuation $10.99(3.69)a $9.22(3.25)b $5.73(3.37)c
Liking 6.26(1.07)a 5.62(0.97)b 3.56(1.26)c
Means within rows that do not share a common subscript differ by p < 0.05
(Fisher’s LSD). Standard deviations are in parentheses.
EXPERIMENT 2: ACTUAL SATISFACTION
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
One hundred thirty-three Carnegie Mellon University under-
graduates (79 women, Mage = 20.02, SD = 1.28) in Pittsburgh,
PA received course credit for completing a laboratory experiment.
Procedure
Participants saw and inspected images of the five posters (in ran-
dom positions), after they learned that they would receive a full
size poster of one of these five posters in the experiment. Next,
participants randomly assigned to the deliberate choice condi-
tion were instructed to “Think carefully about the posters until
you identify the poster you most prefer” and then indicated that
poster in the array. Participants assigned to the mind wandering
condition were instructed to “Let your mind wander until the
poster you feel most drawn to randomly comes tomind” and then
indicated that poster in the array. Participants assigned to the ran-
dom assignment condition were randomly assigned one poster in
the array.
All participants then saw an image of the poster selected and
were given a 24′′ × 36′′ rolled print of it by a research assis-
tant. Next, participants were given the opportunity to sell back
their poster to the experimenter. Participants indicated how sim-
ilar they felt they were to other people receiving their poster on
three dimensions: general similarity, conscious thoughts and pref-
erences, and unconscious thoughts and preferences, on 6-point
scales with endpoints, Very Dissimilar (1) to Very Similar (6).
The following screen presented participants with an incentive-
compatible Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) procedure, con-
sisting of 15 pairs of binding choices: (a) to keep the poster or
(b) sell the poster back to the experimenter for a cash sum. The
amounts started at $1 and increased in $1 increments to $15. The
highest value at which participants chose to keep their poster was
recorded as their monetary valuation of the poster. To insure that
the task was incentive compatible, participants were informed
that at the end of the experiment, one of the values ranging from
$1 to $15 would be randomly drawn and they would keep the
poster or sell the poster back to the experimenter at that amount,
depending on the choice they had made for that pair (e.g., if par-
ticipants chose, “I would prefer to keep the poster” rather than “I
would prefer to sell the poster for the cash payment” at $5 and
$5 was chosen, participants would keep the poster). Participants
knew they did not have the opportunity to change their mind at a
later time.
Participants then reported the extent to which they liked their
poster and preferred it to the other four posters in the exper-
iment on 7-point scales with endpoints, Extremely Dislike (1)
and Extremely Like (7), and Much prefer the other posters (1)
and Much prefer your poster (7). After participants provided their
demographic information, they were assigned to either keep their
poster or sell it back for the cash payment according to their
earlier choice.
RESULTS
One participant was excluded from further analyses because
her choices in the BDM procedure were inconsistent and thus
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impossible to code. The extent to which participants preferred
their poster to the other posters and liked their posters was highly
correlated, r(130) = 0.64, p < 0.001 so they were averaged into a
single measure of liking.
Monetary valuation
We first examined the money participants chose to forgo to keep
their poster by condition with a between-subjects ANOVA, which
revealed a significant main effect, F(2, 129) = 3.34, p = 0.04, η2p =
0.05. Post-hoc tests (Fisher’s LSD) confirmed that participants
in the deliberate choice and mind wandering conditions were
willing to forgo larger sums of money to keep their poster than
were participants in the random assignment condition, ps ≤ 0.04.
There was no significant difference in price between the deliberate
choice and mind wandering conditions, p = 0.88 (see Table 2).
Liking
We next examined the extent to which participants liked the
poster that they received by condition with a between-subjects
ANOVA, which revealed a significant main effect, F(2, 129) =
39.12, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.38. Post-hoc tests (Fisher’s LSD) con-
firmed that participants in the deliberate choice and mind wan-
dering conditions liked their posters more than did participants
in the random assignment condition, ps ≤ 0.001. There was no
significant difference in liking between participants in the delib-
erate choice and the mind wandering conditions, p = 0.92 (see
Table 2).
Choice of poster
One obvious possibility is that participants in the deliberate
choice and mind wandering conditions exhibited similar valua-
tions and liking for their posters simply because they chose the
same posters. Thus, we conducted a χ2 Test of Independence to
compare the distributions of posters received across conditions.
Most important, the distribution of posters received for partic-
ipants in the deliberate choice and mind wandering conditions
differed significantly between conditions, χ2(4, N = 90) = 9.77, p =
0.04. Similarly, the distribution of posters received by participants
in the deliberate choice and random assignment conditions dif-
fered significantly between conditions, χ2(4, N = 87) = 15.04, p =
0.005. The distribution of posters received by participants in
the mind wandering and random assignment conditions, how-
ever, only differed marginally in the posters that they received,
χ2(4, N = 87) = 8.38, p = 0.08.
Between-subject ANOVAs revealed no significant effects on
participants’ ratings of similarity to others receiving their poster,
so we do not discuss them further, all Fs< 1.1, all ps> 0.34.




Monetary valuation $6.58 (4.38)a $6.71 (4.28)a $4.67 (3.57)b
Liking 5.69 (0.86)a 5.67 (0.74)a 4.01 (1.31)b
Means within rows that do not share a common subscript differ by p < 0.05
(Fisher’s LSD). Standard deviations are in parentheses.
DISCUSSION
In contrast to the predictions made by participants in Experiment
1, post-choice satisfaction with posters chosen using mind wan-
dering as a choice strategy was as high as with posters chosen by
an optimal deliberate strategy. Participants who chose a poster
by mind wandering liked and valued their poster as much as
did participants who chose the best poster by deliberation, even
though the posters they chose were different. Finally, both strate-
gies yielded higher satisfaction than did random assignment to
a poster, suggesting that not all posters were equal in desirabil-
ity and that outcome evaluations were sensitive to the process by
which outcomes were selected.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Decisions made by mind wandering appear to be unexpectedly
satisfying. People expect to be less satisfied with decisions made
by using mind wandering as a choice strategy than with deliber-
ate strategies (Experiment 1). This belief appears, at least in some
cases, to be a prediction error. Participants reported similar post-
choice satisfaction with decisions made by mind wandering and
by deliberation when choosing from consideration sets with real
differences (Experiment 2).
The results of Experiment 2 suggested that participants who
made a decision by mind wandering did not simply use a deliber-
ate strategy to choose a poster. The posters chosen by participants
in the mind wandering and deliberate choice conditions were
significantly different. Post-choice satisfaction was lower for par-
ticipants in Experiment 2 who were randomly assigned a poster
than for participants who chose a poster by mind wandering or
with an optimal deliberate strategy. The inclusion of the random
assignment condition further mitigates concerns that the simi-
lar post-choice satisfaction of participants in the mind wandering
and deliberate choice conditions was due to participants ignoring
the instructions to employ different choice strategies, or resulted
from the use of consideration sets with indistinguishably different
alternatives. These results do not support the alternative possibil-
ities that participants ignored the instructions or were insensitive
to differences in the consideration sets.
The discrepancy between the predicted and actual satisfac-
tion with decisions using mind wandering as a decision strategy
may be due in part to detrimental effects of over-deliberation on
choice satisfaction (Wilson et al., 1993). Notably, we did not ask
participants in the deliberation condition of our study to intro-
spect or list reasons for their preferences (as in Wilson et al.,
1993). Instead, they were asked simply to “think carefully about
the posters until you identify the poster you most prefer.” As a
result, our deliberation instructions likely represent an interme-
diate level of thought; most importantly, our results extend this
previous research by directly comparing predicted and actual sat-
isfaction with decisions made by deliberation to decisions made
by mind wandering.
Our findings also contribute to research examining the impact
of unconscious vs. conscious decision processes on choice sat-
isfaction (e.g., Dijksterhuis and van Olden, 2006). Unconscious
thought has been defined as “object-relevant or task-relevant
thought processes that occur while conscious thought is directed
elsewhere” and is typically operationalized by having participants
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complete a distraction task for several minutes, allowing them to
continue thinking about the decision only at an unconscious level
(Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006, p. 96). The decision strategy
of mind wandering could be considered to be a means of instan-
tiating unconscious thought (i.e., people can distract themselves
by mind wandering while they continue to direct unconscious
thought at the decision problem). Unconscious thought has been
argued to perform better than deliberate thought, especially for
complex decisions and specifically for the same type of stim-
uli used in the present studies—art posters (Dijksterhuis and
Nordgren, 2006; Dijksterhuis and van Olden, 2006; but see Acker,
2008). Self-paced deliberation has been argued to be an important
boundary condition for the superior performance of distrac-
tion tasks vs. a constrained time period of forced deliberation
(Payne et al., 2008). Because our goal was to compare mind wan-
dering to deliberation, we did not manipulate the amount of
time participants were required to spend making their decision
in Experiment 2; future research should covary both decision
process (mind wandering vs. deliberation) and timing, to exam-
ine the joint impact. Our results suggest that people fail to
predict that self-paced mind wandering (i.e., engaging in self-
distraction) might not leave them less satisfied than self-paced
deliberation.
We offer several speculative explanations for the mismatch
between predictions and actual outcomes of mind wandering
and deliberative decision strategies, and the potential benefits to
decision makers. First, deliberation can instantiate post-choice
regret. Satisfaction with a chosen alternative is a function of sat-
isfaction with its positive attributes and how it compares with
rejected alternatives (Sagi and Friedland, 2007). Unhappiness and
regret have been found to be more acute for people who engage
in utility maximization strategies than for those who pursue a
satisficing strategy (Schwartz et al., 2002). Because mind wan-
dering is associated with worse encoding of external information
(Schooler et al., 2011), it may reduce comparison among alter-
natives and prompt satisficing strategies that reduce feelings of
regret relative to more deliberative choice strategies that prompt
maximizing strategies. Of course, there are likely decision types
in which mind wandering would in fact lead to lower post-choice
satisfaction, such as when deciding the guilt of a defendant or
whether to undergo a medical procedure (Inbar et al., 2010).
We present evidence from a choice context—an array of art
posters—where items were pretested to be minimally different
in positive ratings. This consideration set has similar features to
other kinds of trivial everyday choices (e.g., toothbrushes, flights,
or jams) that have been suggested to make the act of decision
making more frustrating or aversive, especially when accompa-
nied by the perception of high decision difficulty or numerous
options (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Sela and Berger, 2012). We
suggest that mind wandering might perform as well as deliber-
ation, in part, because it is less prone to instantiating decision
conflict and choice deferral as the result of carefully compar-
ing choice attributes, especially from large consideration sets.
Evaluations of cognitive effort expended as the result of mind
wandering or deliberation is an interesting question for future
investigation. When choosing from a large choice set, mind wan-
dering might be especially likely to leave decision makers feeling
less overwhelmed or drained as compared to deliberation. Rather
than expending cognitive effort attempting to find a maximizing
alternative, people might be just as satisfied forgoing deliberation
altogether, and instead letting their mind wander in order tomake
their choice. Deciding by mind wandering may seem at face value
as disturbing as driving on autopilot, but seems to similarly guide
one to a satisfactory destination.
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